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Resilience as Emergent Behavior  
Peter Hayes* 
In this article, I briefly review the diversion of the climate policy world 
into a single-minded fixation with mitigation.  I assert that it is increasingly 
clear that the main game is now adaptation which renders mitigation no less 
urgent, but shifts the political equation in dramatic ways that cannot be 
ignored any longer.  I suggest that global state and market-based solutions 
will fall far short of an adequate response.  The responsibility will devolve to 
cities and local communities to pick up the pieces.  I review some of the 
swarming and network strategies that may enable these communities to 
supplement or supplant state-based adaptation frameworks over the coming 
generation. 
Mitigation-Adaptation 
The first phase (1988-2008) of climate change policy and research work 
focused on gaining traction with the political elites.  The task entailed 
overcoming political, cultural, and institutional resistance to recognition of 
the validity and soundness of the science on the one hand, and learning 
from practical grappling with the technical-economic mitigation problem in 
the real world on the other.  The political path of least resistance over these 
two decades was to create a global scientific consensus based on modeling 
and compiling data sets.  These data sets were used to both inform and 
convince policy makers to attend to the climate issue, while also focusing on 
the tractable, affordable, and (in principle) global positive sum game of 
“mitigation.”  Mitigation was stressed based on the belief that an ounce of 
mitigation now is worth a pound of adaptation later, especially when the 
benefits of mitigation are global no matter where achieved and shared, 
whereas the benefits of adaptation are mostly local and not shared. 
This political task was enshrined in the 1992 Climate Change 
Convention which created new institutions and related methods, particularly 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and implementing agencies.  Global 
actors largely ignored the issue of burden sharing in the pursuit of efficient 
allocation of the minimal resources that were made available to build 
mitigation capacity in poor countries.  Equitable and adequate international 
burden sharing of mitigation cost was mostly disregarded in the effort to 
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“start the ball rolling” and to keep the climate negotiations alive, with or 
without the United States as a prime mover. 
In this start-up phase, the international community accorded 
secondary importance to adaptation and subordinated to the primary task of 
achieving policy consensus that climate change exists and matters.  The 
intention was to avoid distraction from mitigation, and the strategy was 
grounded in the belief that mitigation was and is the first order of business. 
The first of these goals – achieving a global consensus that climate change 
risk is real and pressing – was achieved, albeit belatedly.  The result, 
however, was that science of climate was diverted away from investigating 
many urgent and critical adaptation issues.  Instead, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) focused scientific research on climate 
change to support the demands of inter-state negotiations and to defining 
impacts.  Consequently, a conceptual and institutional framework for global 
adaptation is almost absent.  
What Is at Stake? 
In 1972, Jun Ui published his basic theory of kogai, which he derived 
from his experience of working with the victims of mercury poisoning at 
Minamata in 1958 and in their court case from 1968-71, then articulating the 
“principles of pollution” in his KOGAI Newsletter from Polluted Japan, 
published by his organization Jishu Koza in the nineteen seventies.1  Ui was 
the first modern theorist to explain the displacement in space and time of 
biological and physical costs via ecological systems from one class of 
beneficiaries to other classes of victims, thereby generalizing the experience 
of the Minamata episode.  In many respects, this dynamic is similar to the 
problem of land mines that are strewn for short-term military advantage, but 
remain in situ for years, even decades, until they explode and maim or kill 
civilians who had no relationship to the original conflict.  One can think of 
the imposition of the array of biological, physical, and social-cultural 
climate costs in a similar manner to hurling hand grenades randomly into 
the future without knowledge or concern as to when or where they fall to the 
ground, and who would be hurt or killed when the grenade exploded.  In 
short, climate risk has global, spatial, and temporal dimensions.  The costs 
of climate change relative to conceivable worlds without massive 
anthropogenic climate loading are vast, although they are still not known 
with any precision.  It is already well understood that these costs will fall 
disproportionately on those least able to bear them.  Incremental 
adaptation costs are likely to eventually exceed the marginal costs of 
mitigation and justified global burden sharing (roughly $30 billion per year 
1. Jun Ui, Industrial Pollution in Japan 103-31 (Jun Ui ed., United Nations
University Press 1992). 
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in 1994 dollars)2 by at least an order of magnitude, possibly much more.3  
Displacing the costs of climate change due to the activities of this 
generation’s wealthy and powerful societies onto future poor and vulnerable 
populations on Earth will be by far the biggest fleecing in history; all that 
remains is to see how devastating this impact will be. 
Therefore, adaptation is now the main game, not mitigation. 
Moreover, far from being the enemy of mitigation, it is at least conceivable 
that the constituencies mobilized by climate impacts may finally muster the 
political will to achieve the requisite levels of mitigation hitherto missing; 
that is, adaptation will be the friend, not the enemy of mitigation.  
Global Frameworks 
In most treatments of climate change politics and economics, the key 
protagonists are states and corporations, and the key institutions are 
treaties and markets.  Sometimes scientists and social movements are 
recognized as playing epistemic or bridging roles in order to overcome 
yawning institutional or market failures, but their roles are usually 
epiphenomenal. 
Without going into detail, the emerging global framework for building 
adaptive capacity is, put mildly, weak and inadequate.4  If mitigation-related 
incremental funding is running at about one percent of a justified level 
based on capacity-to-pay and historic-responsibility-to-pay, incremental 
adaptation funding will likely run at perhaps 0.1 percent (less money, far 
greater incremental needs for adaptation than in mitigation) of a justified 
level.  While in general the emerging global framework for building adaptive 
capacity is deficient, some organizations such as the GEF, United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), and multilateral and bilateral adaptation 
projects in developing countries are exploring the new adaptation terrain. 
This is excellent, exciting, and worth both investment and support.  As they 
explore this terrain, they are revisiting old lessons from decades of 
misplaced, abused, and failed development assistance and discovering new 
challenges and potential routes to reducing social vulnerability and to 
increasing social resilience. 
2. Peter Hayes, North South Transfer, in GLOBAL GREENHOUSE REGIME:  WHO PAYS? 144, 
153-54 (P.Hayes & K. Smith, eds. UN University Press/Earthscan Press, Tokyo & London 
1993), available at http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80836e/80836E00.htm 
3. Id.
4. See, PETER HAYES, MULTIPLE JEOPARDIES: EMERGING GLOBAL RULES FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE ADAPTATION, available at http://www.nautilus.org/~rmit/forum-reports/0619a-
hayes.html. Videotape: China-U.S. Climate Change Forum: What’s at Risk?, available at 
http://youtube.com/watch?v=u5j8 7MteMXk. 
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State-based international assistance, however, is almost certainly far 
too little and arriving far too late to rely on as a route to successful 
adaptation in most of the world.  Given the level of increasing and enduring 
global poverty, the ability of markets to create adaptive capacities in most 
rural areas and slums is highly constrained.  Also, like states, markets are 
unlikely to create or deliver the capacities needed for either mitigation or 
adaptation.  Without these capacities, massive and potentially catastrophic 
climate change cannot be avoided.  
These shortcomings require a search for radical new solutions based 
on linked communities at a global level.  If states and markets fail as badly 
as seems likely, then legitimate leadership that responds to the global 
climate adaptation challenge will emerge primarily at the sub-national state, 
city, and local community levels, supplemented by global civil society 
(roughly 25,000 intergovernmental and non-governmental international 
organizations).  
Fortunately, this set of diverse global-local players is already inclined 
to communicate, coordinate, and collaborate in the search for shared 
solutions via trans-governmental processes, inter-city linkages, and vibrant 
diasporic and “glocal” networks between local communities.  The cost of 
long distance communication and coordination is falling rapidly; the 
number of pro-active players at this level is increasing exponentially. 
Already, approximately 200 major cities, perhaps 20,000 medium and small 
cities and towns, and perhaps 200,000 local communities are wired and 
participating in networks that are active in attempting to solve one or more 
of the dozens of interrelated global problems and solutions linked directly 
or indirectly with climate change, as well as directly tackling climate change 
adaptation.5   
At this local level, cooperative outcomes are sought out of necessity 
and based upon the identification of joint interest and cooperative benefits 
realized directly by communication and coordination.  Such joint interests 
or organic reasons to cooperate include: direct ecological interdependence 
(downwind); trade; shared cultural heritage; historical origins (metropole-
colonial cities); common climate circumstances; shared threats (terrorism); 
etc.  This process will be facilitated (and blocked as well) by some of the 
innovative inter-state and market-based approaches discussed at this 
conference, many of which provide clues about the future that are fresh and 
provocative.  Yet none of these solutions are likely to be as powerful as the 
combination of necessity and solidarity that will drive city and community-
5. This is an estimate based on the assumption that roughly each of the 200
global cities (real number) has about 10 (less-global) major cities = 2,000, and each 
of these has about 10 satellite small towns (approximated at 22,500 global cities, 
cities, and towns); and each of these has at least 10 localities in them, hence the 
estimated 200,000 localities. 
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level cooperation and collaborative problem solving, orchestrated by 
transnational networks.  
Part of the challenge with collaborative problem-solving is to make the 
stocks of existing knowledge and research capacity available to knowledge 
users in response to rapidly emerging climate “issue clusters” that cross 
bureaucratic-disciplinary-sector boundaries in unexpected and unconven-
tional ways.  Another is to explore the true complexity of the interrelated 
problems that drive climate change and block mitigation and adaptation, 
using new research methods such as agent-based rather than system-based 
modeling.6  
In this view, the most urgent task is not to focus on inter-state 
negotiations, important as these may be.  Rather, the task is to establish 
principles and practices of direct cooperation between cities and local 
communities of all kinds;7 identify practical and testable tools and practices 
that can be developed in one locale and shared and replicated with dozens 
or hundreds of others on a tailored-to-need basis;8 and establish 
mechanisms for transmission and sharing of the tools and practices that 
work.9  The right metaphor for this process is not institutional architecture, 
but think-nets, small worlds-network theory, immunological “swarming” 
behavior, and other learning strategies that rely on viral replication for scale 
and success.   
6. E.g., Peter Hayes, Agent-Based Modelling and Climate Change Adaptation, Global 
Cities Institute Climate Change Adaptation Program (2008), available at http://gc.nautilus. 
org/gci/agent-based-modelling/RMIT%20overview%20rev%20Jan31-08.pdf/ view; Anthony 
Patt & B. Bernd Siebenhüner, Agent Based Modeling and Adaptation to Climate Change, 
74(2), Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung (Quarterly Journal of Economic Research), 
310, 310–20 (2005) (discussing an early application of agent based modeling and climate 
change application), available at http://www.vulnerabilitynet.org/OPMS/getfile.php?bn= 
seiproject_hotel&key=1140130223&att_id=953; Scott Moss, Claudia Pahl-Wostl & Thomas 
Downing, Agent-based integrated assessment modeling: the example of climate change, 2, 
Integrated Assessment, 17, 17-30, (2001) (discussing the benefit of employing social 
simulation models, rather than economic models, in addressing complex environmental 
problems); Brian J. L. Berry, L. Douglas Kiel, & Euel Elliott, Adaptive Agents, Intelligence, 
and Emergent Human Organization: Capturing Complexity through Agent-Based Modeling, 
99, Suppl. 3, Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences (2002) (an overview of 
the agent-based modeling field), available at http://www.pnas. org/content/vol99/suppl_3/. 
7. See, Five climate principles adopted by the SF Business Council on Climate
Change at: https://www.bc3sfbay.org/principles. 
8. See, Power tools: for policy influence in natural resource management,
http://www.policy-powertools.org/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2008). 
9. See, Climate Change Adaptation at the Global Collaborative, at
http://gc.nautilus.org/gci (last visited Oct. 13, 2008). 
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Fortunately, there are many, many examples to choose from in this 
early learning phase of bottom-up, “emergent” adaptation.  The 
International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives, the Clinton 
Foundation’s C40 Large Cities Climate Leadership Group and Climate 
Initiative, and bilateral projects related to Ho Chi Minh City, Melbourne, 
Jakarta, Beijing, Seoul, and Pyongyang are various examples.  The San 
Francisco Bay Area is a global dynamo in this dimension with participation 
from individuals, groups, government, and business.  Indeed, Google Foun-
dation may be the single most powerful and creative force on the planet, 
particularly if it can align with partners such as the Aga Kahn Foundation.  
Conclusion 
That these social capacities will collide with state and market-based 
frameworks in critical respects is more or less inevitable.  Whether they will 
also be nurtured and provide critically needed support and extension of 
these frameworks is less obvious.  Optimism, however, remains important as 
ever!  Arguably, over the next, cities and corporations will merge, and 
vibrant city-states will become more powerful relative to nation-states.  The 
membership of the United Nations may increase by tenfold or more, and as 
a result, by 2050 the climate change dye will have been cast for the coming 
millennia.  This shift in power ratios, the rise of many sources of innovation 
and interconnection, and above all, high levels of work-related migration, 
will transform the global landscape.Of particular importance is not what 
happens in the United States or Europe, but in China and India, because 
these two societies and economies represent the most salient development 
models for most communities on the planet.  Further, Indonesia may play a 
crucial role in climate development models because its 40 million Muslims 
may generate an Islamic renaissance that represents a new source of global 
leadership. 
Whether cities and local communities will rise to the occasion and pick 
up the pieces dropped by states and markets in the past remains unknown. 
However, with virtual certainty,   the main adaptive action will occur at local 
levels.  As John Holdren has long argued, we will adapt; the only question 
remaining is the ratio between the various types of adaptation – mitigation, 
pro-active and anticipatory adaptation, or just plain suffering.10 
10. John P. Holdren, Science and Technology for Sustainable Well-Being, 319
Science, 424, 425-34 (2008), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/ 
319/5862/424.pdf. 
